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SUPPLEMENT
The following article is one of the papers submitted by a student in
fulfillment of one of the course requirements as a candidate for the
degree of Masters in Law and Taxation.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION-VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE; HISTORY, REVOCATION
AND REVIVAL
R. BARROW BLACKWELL
Almost thirty years ago the Department of Treasury abandoned its
longstanding policy of not recommending criminal prosecution to the
Justice Department of a taxpayer who, prior to an investigation of his
tax status by the then Bureau of Internal Revenue, voluntarily disclosed
to proper Bureau officials that he had filed a fraudulent return or had
willfully failed to file a return. First announced to the public in 1945,
this policy of voluntary disclosure was withdrawn on January 10, 1952.1
Derived from neither statute nor regulations,2 the policy was instead a
discretionary rule of administration which stemmed from the general
supervisory powers of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in aid
of his principal function, the collection of the revenue. 3
This paper explores the history of the voluntary disclosure policy, its
nature and operative effect, the problem of its administration, the
reasons for its abandonment and, finally, the attempts to revive it. In
doing so, primary focus is directed to the arguments, both pro and
con, of voluntary disclosure as a tool of federal tax policy, with com-
ment on its place, if any, in the enforcement of the criminal tax laws.
The voluntary disclosure policy was first made public in a press
release on August 21, 1945 by then Secretary of the Treasury Vinson:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue does not recommend
criminal prosecution in the case of any taxpayer who makes a
voluntary disclosure of omission or other misstatement in his
tax return or of failure to make a return. 4
The policy, however, had been formulated and implemented long
before its public announcement. In a speech on May 14, 1947, J. P.
Wenchel, then Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, stated:
I Baiter, Tax Fraud and Evasion (3d Ed.), 1963, Section 4.2, page 4, citing
Treas. Dept. Announcement S-2930, Jan. 10, 1952.
2 Burns and Rachlin, "Should We Penalize Voluntary Disclosures?", 28 TAXES
39, January, 1950.
3 Letter of the Attorney General of the United States to the Secretary of Treasury
regarding voluntary disclosure legislation, dated June 1, 1950.
4 Winer, "Voluntary Disclosures and Related Federal Tax Fraud Matters," 26
B.U.L.Rev. 1, 16 (Jan. 1946); Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 39.
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There is nothing new in this position. For years the position
of the Department has been that where the taxpayer makes
a voluntary disclosure of intentional evasion before the investi-
gation has been initiated criminal prosecution will not be
recommended.'
The policy's historical antecedents are found at least as far back as
1934, and probably as early as 1919. Initially, the policy appears to
have been formulated in a confidential mimeograph issued to Bureau
personnel on September 8, 1919:
In cases in which fraud or intentional evasion is discovered
thorugh internal revenue officers, or is disclosed after the
Bureau has initiated an investigation of tax liability, it will be
the policy of the Bureau to impose the maximum civil penalties
and institute criminal prosecution...
In cases in which voluntary disclosure is made of deficiencies
thorugh intentional evasions which if discovered by internal
revenue officers would be made the basis of criminal prosecu-
tion, it will be the policy of the Bureau to impose the maximum
civil penalties and to consider offers in compromise of the
criminal liability, instead of initiating prosecution and insisting
on a jail sentence.r
This policy was effectuated by use of statutory compromise agreements
pursuant to the forerunners of Section 7122 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7
In 1934 the voluntary disclosure policy was restated in another con-
fidential Bureau mimeograph:
Where a violation of the internal revenue laws is deliberate
and with the intent to defraud, and is discovered through in-
ternal revenue officers, or is disclosed by the taxpayer after
the Bureau has initiated an investigation, the criminal liability
will in no case be compromised by the Treasury Department.
Prosecution will be recommended or not, solely on the basis
of whether the evidence is sufficient to afford reasonable
grounds for the belief that a conviction can be secured.
In cases in which taxpayers make voluntary disclosures of
intentional evasions before investigation by the Bureau has
been initiated, the Bureau will not recommend criminal prose-
cution, but will impose the maximum civil panalties unless
there is substantial doubt as to collectibilty. 8
' Burns and Rachlin, 28 TADES 39.
6 Paul Lipton, "Prosecutions for Tax Evasions-New Policies and Procedures,"
30 TAXES 356, 357-358 (May, 1952).
7Lipton, 30 TAXES 358, referring to the predecessors of IRC Section 3761.
8 Id., at page 358.
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This revised statement removed some of the doubt implied by the
word "consider" in the 1919 version, a word which had been substi-
tuted for "accept" as finally drafted.' After 1934 the Bureau's policy
was theoretically less discretionary: criminal prosecution would not be
recommended if the taxpayer's fraud was properly and timely disclosed.
Statutory compromise agreements were no longer utilized; thereafter
cases were handled on an individual basis as purely an administrative
matter. 10 It was substantially in this form that the policy was an-
nounced to the public in 1945.
The purpose of the voluntary disclosure policy was to increase tax
revenues at a cost which was minimal to the government. In support of
the policy, Bureau Chief Counsel Wenchel stated in 1947:
In excusing the man from criminal prosecution we are
merely taking the sensible step to produce the revenue called
for by the law with the minimal cost of investigation. The man
who makes a voluntary disclosure saves us a lot of money in
investigating. In return, we can spare him a term in jail. This
is good business from his standpoint and it is good business
from the government's standpoint.":
Public announcement of the policy, however, coincided with a surging
increase in tax evasion during the second world war. The number of
evasion cases received by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue nearly
tripled between 1942 and 1945 and more than doubled again between
1946 and 1947.12 These increases were variously attributed to un-
precedented increases in the individual income tax rates,' as well as
to a stiff excess profits tax levied on corporations and the proliferation
of black market operations during the war.' 4 The Bureau launched
a vigorous drive on tax fraud at the end of the war, but faced with
manpower shortages, the statutes of limitation and the increasing diffi-
culty of detecting fraud over time," the Treasury Department felt com-
pelled to enlist the aid of practical-minded and conscience-stricken
taxpayers. Although then Bureau Chief Counsel Wenchel declared that
in the first eighteen months after the policy was announced an addi-
9 Id., at page 358.
10 Id., at page 358.
" Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 40.
12 Turner L. Smith, "Policies and Procedures in Income Tax Fraud Cases," 28
TAXES 761, 762 (August, 1950). The number of income tax evasion cases re-
ceived from the Commissioner for the eight year period from 1942 to 1949 were as
follows:
1942 ...................... 79 1946 ..................... 241
1943 ..................... 93 1947 ...................... 523
1944 ........... .......... 71 1948 .................... 691
1945 ...................... 203 1949 ...................... 420
-. Smith, 28 TAXES 762; Lipton, 30 TAXES 358.
14 Smith, 28 TAXES 762.
15 Lipton, 28 TAXES 358.
TAX CONFERENCE
tional $500 million was collected from such disclosures,' the Bureau
later admitted at the King Subcommittee hearings, which were investi-
gating purported corruption in the Bureau, that it had no statistics to
show how much revenue the policy actually had produced.'-
As described by Mr. Wenchel the policy was a simple one:
And what is a voluntary disclosure? A voluntary disclosure
occurs when a taxpayer of his own free will and accord, and
before any investigation is initiated, discloses fraud upon the
government...a"
In theory the procedure for accomplishing a voluntary disclosure
was equally straightforward:
The making of a voluntary disclosure is a simple thing. The
taxpayer or his legal agent can go before any official of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or any of its field offices-whether
it is a Collector, a Deputy Collector, a Revenue Agent, a
Special Agent, or any other responsible Treasury officer.
There is no special form for making the disclosure. The simple
statement that 'I have filed false returns and I want to make
the government whole' would constitute a complete disclo-
sure. Of course, it is usually best to present an amended
return or other written document as evidence of the disclo-
sure. 19
In short, the disclosure had to be voluntary, complete,20 made before
the proper Treasury or Bureau representatives, accompanied by the
payment of civil penalties eventually imposed, and accomplished before
an investigation had been initiated by the Bureau. This latter require-
ment was critical and "initiation of an investigation" was defined thus:
The mere record of a name does not mean that an investiga-
tion has been initiated. The fact is that examining officers
throughout the country have thousands of names or possible
leads. To deny the existence of voluntary disclosure merely
because we have a name, would be comparable to regarding
the telephone book as a dossier of tax evaders.
An investigation is initiated whcn a Special Agent, an In-
ternal Revenue agent, a Deputy Collector, or other Bureau
16 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 39.
17 Lipton, 28 TAXES 358, n.53.
18 Jones, "Voluntary Disclosure Policy of the Treasury Department," Note, 6
Tax L. Rev. 329, 330 (N.Y.U. March, 1951); Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 39.
19 Note, 6 Tax L. Rev. 330.
20 Where disclosure not complete, no offer of immunity. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963); Mortensen, Federal Tax Fraud Law, Section
60, p. 68 (1958).
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officer, is assigned a return for examination, or where an
investigating officer has requested the advice of appropriate
officers of the Bureau with respect to the filing of a return
or the payment of taxes. 21
The time of disclosure and the time an investigation begins
are, therefore, matters which can be ascertained with com-
plete objectivity and certainty, thus protecting both the gov-
ernment and the taxpayer from decisions based on guesswork
or other vague circumstances. To assure adherence to this
principle, the Bureau stands ready at all times where a dispute
may arise as to the time of a disclosure and the time an in-
vestigation was initiated to open its records in that regard.22
Despite this apparently well-defined policy and procedure, in practice
the policy did not work nearly so simply. A major difficulty for the
taxpayer was in knowing whether he had timely disclosed his misdeeds.
Notwithstanding as declared "openness" of Bureau files,2 8 one com-
mentator has stated that this was not true in practice and that "no
instruction to that effect was ever issued to the (Bureau's) Field
Offices." 2 4 Moreover, some special agents' offices took the position that
if any investigation had been commenced by a governmental authority,
not necessarily a federal agency, it was too late to make a voluntary dis-
closure.25
The taxpayer, in inquiring of various Treasury agencies whether an
investigation of his tax status had in fact begun, ran the risk of himself
triggering an investigation,20 and his curiosity would doubtless inspire
a more comprehensive investigation, if already initiated.27 Inquiries
would have to be directed to several places. It was conceivable that
the Agent in Charge of the taxpayer's district would have no knowledge
that a Collector or Special Agent in Charge had already assigned the
taxpayer's return for examination.2 8
Additionally, it was not always clear when an investigation had
begun. Had an investigation of the taxpayer begun where he was only
part of a "chain' 'investigation involving his financial dealings with
other taxpayers who were under investigation for tax fraud? 29 The
problem of determining when a collateral investigation became a
primary one as to a particular taxpayer was raised in United States V.
Weisman, 78 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mass. 1948). There, the special agent
had conducted a collateral investigation involving Weisman's financial
21 Note, 6 Tax L. Rev. 330.
22 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 39, at page 40.
23 Volume 12, N.Y.U. Inst. on Federal Taxation, "Voluntary Disclosures," page
213, at 215, n.130.
24 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES at 41.
25 John Griffin, "Fraud," 28 TAXES 151, 159 (February 1950).
20 Baiter, "Should Your Client 'Cooperate' When Charged with Tax Fraud?",
29 TAXES 290, 295 (April, 1951); Griffin, 28 TAXES 159.
27 12 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 215.
28 Id.
29 Baiter, 29 TAXES 294, 295.
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transaction with others. Sensing that he would be the target of a further
probe, Weisman confessed his misdeeds. His disclosure was not con-
sidered timely, however. The investigation had begun with other
taxpayers who were involved with Weisman. 0 Thus, Weisman's defense
that his confession had been improperly obtained was rejected; he had
not been required to divulge the information to Bureau officials. 81
If a taxpayer was investigated as to a particular year, there was a
further problem as to whether his voluntary disclosure would be ac-
cepted as to prior and subsequent years.8 2 Or, if a taxpayer's return
was examined and he was assessed a deficiency which he paid and then
disclosed additional information regarding transactions for the period
covered by the return which indicated fraud, was the voluntary dis-
closure timely made? 38 Or, this further problem suggested by one
commentator: "whether a voluntary disclosure by a taxpayer as to
fraud in his individual tax return will be considered a grant of immunity
to a corporation in which the taxpayer is a substantial stockholder and
where the corporation itself has defaulted on its taxes by diverting part
of its income to the stockholder." 8 -
The fact that the initiation of an investigation was unknown to the
taxpayer did not help his cause. In Lapides v. United States, 215 F.2d
253 (2nd Cir. 1954), a taxpayer obtained an order from the district
court requiring the United States Attorney to show cause why certain
evidence divulged by the taxpayer as part of what he believed was a
voluntary disclosure should not be suppressed from being presented
to the grand jury. After a hearing, the order was dismissed and the
taxpayer was subsequently indicted and found guilty. The taxpayer
had voluntarily disclosed that he had not reported specified income for
the five years from 1946 to 1950. This disclosure was made on May 15,
1951. Unbeknownst to the taxpayer, a special agent of the Bureau
had been assigned to undertake a preliminary investigation of the
taxpayer's returns on April 14, 1951, an investigation prompted by
state criminal charges against the taxpayer for maintaining a lottery and
gambling. The Special Agent consulted with the State's Attorney on
April 23, 1951, requisitioned the taxpayer's returns on April 27, 1951,
and transferred the investigation to another Special Agent on May 15,
1951.
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the crucial issue of whether
the disclosure had been timely. In holding that it was, the Court stated
(p. 256):
... For even if it were so that the appellant, when he made
his disclosure on May 15, 1951, did not know, notwithstand-
80 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 40-41.
81 Id.; Mortensen, Federal Tax Fraud Law, Section 60, p. 68 (Bobbs-Merrill
1958).
32 Balter, 29 TAXES 294, 295.
8 12 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 217.
34 Balter, 29 TAXES 294-295.
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ing the publicity as to his arrest, that a federal tax investiga-
tion had already been initiated, and even if in April, 1953,
when he brought the motion initiating this proceeding, he
thought that his disclosure had precipitated the departmental
investigation, it would not follow that his disclosure was
timely. Only if, in fact, no investigation had been begun, was
his disclosure timely. United States v. Levy, D.C. Conn., 1951,
99 F.Supp. 529. The mere fact that the Department did not
inform him and that he did not know that an investigation
had begun was irrelevant. Any holding to the contrary con-
tained in the case of In re Liebster, D.C., E.D. Pa., 1950,
we cannot approve.
Support for this holding is at least implicit in White v. United States,
194 F.2d. 215 (5th Cir. 1952), involving a motion to suppress infor-
mation obtained by Internal Revenue agents from taxpayers who had
disclosed their -fraud in the belief that they would be granted immunity
from criminal prosecution. The district court held that the Treasury's
voluntary disclosure policy was not available to taxpayers after an
investigation had been begun, and hence any admissions voluntarily
made without inducement or promise were competent evidence in a
subsequent prosecution. While the facts of White were in dispute as
to the knowledge of the taxpayers, the Court on appeal affirmed that
the disclosures were not timely, having been made only after the
investigation was underway. Accordingly, the taxpayers could not rely
on the voluntary disclosure policy even though they contended that they
were unaware of the investigation. Their statements were therefore not
protected by their privilege against self-incrimination.
A contrary view, expressly rejected by the Second Circuit in Lapides,
was expressed in In re Liebster, 91 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa.' 1950)."
There, the district court accepted the taxpayer's argument that his
statement should be suppressed because they were tendered without
knowledge of an investigation. The Court held that statements made
in the hope of immunity from prosecution where the taxpayer could
demonstrate that he had no knowledge of the investigation could not be
used against the taxpayer in a later prosecution.
While these cases dealt with the admissibility of statements obtained
from allegedly unsuspecting taxpayers, and not with whether the Com-
missioner was or was not obligated to accept the disclosure as timely
made, they nevertheless are authority for materiality of the taxpayer's
knowliedge. In re Liebster remained a distinctly minority view.
The risks to the taxpayer from an untimely disclosure were less
ambiguous. Once the taxpayer approached Bureau officials to make a
disclosure, he had to be prepared for an examination of his books
and records and to voluntarily answer the Bureau's questions under
35 This case is discussed at length in Note, 6 Tax L. Rev. 329, 331-335.
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oath.36 If an investigation had already commenced, the taxpayer's volun-
tary disclosure statements constituted a waiver of the taxpayer's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and any admissions freely
given could be used by the Bureau's agents in making their case against
the taxpaper 37 United States v. Lustig, 163 F.2d. 85 (2nd Cir. 1947).
Moreover, the filing of an amended return based on financial records
which were often in disarray and which caused the amended return
itself to be false constituted a separate offense. 38
With the lack of specific rules defining the identifiable event which
initiated the investigation, the determination of whether a voluntary
disclosure was acceptable was left to the almost unchecked discretion
of Bureau officials, on whose integrity the taxpayer was forced to rely.
In a letter to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of
the Congress, the Bureau stated:
It should be borne in mind that the policy is entirely an
administrative one and in its application the Bureau must be
the ultimate judge of the facts. Cases upon cases have of
course been disposed of without prosecution under the policy.
In the administration of the policy the Bureau attempts in
every possible manner, through conferences with taxpayers
or otherwise, to determine whether the facts of a particular
case come within the voluntary disclosure policy. Where any
tax evader is dissatisfied with the Buerau's decision and con-
tends that his confession of deliberate fraud was obtained and
is being used against him under circumstances which amount
to a snare or delusion, the opportunity exists, just as hap-
pened (in Lustig and Weisman). In the event it is desired to
disclose the application of the Bureau's voluntary disclosure
policy to the facts of any specific case a conference for that
purpose will be arranged on request by the taxpayer.3 9
It is not entirely clear that the taxpayer could actually litigate an
adverse decision by the Bureau: he could litigate the propriety of using
his statements in a subsequent prosecution.40 The Bureau's decision
not to accept an asserted voluntary disclosure was held to be non-
reviewable in Lustig.4' And it was clear that a voluntary disclosure
did not entitle a taxpayer to immunity from prosecution under the
compromise statute.
36 Griffin, 28 TAXES 159.
3 7
1d.
38 12 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 217.
3 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 41.
40 Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES 41.
-11 12 N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Ta. This article quotes the following form Judge
Kennedy in the Lustig case, although this writer has not been able to find the
quoted portion either in the district court or appellate decisions:
Now it is my notion of the law ... that the Secretary of the Treasury
and the named officials must assent to the specific compromise in the
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In the Lustig case,' 2 it held that the voluntary disclosure policy was
not a blanket promise of immunity which had a binding effect on the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. At most a voluntary disclosure
was an offer to compromise. Earlier, the Supreme Court, in Botany
Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1928), had held that the Com-
missioner could only compromise tax claims where the prescribed
statutory formalities had been strictly followed and the consent of the
Treasury Secretary or his delegate had been given. Informal agreements
had no binding effect on the Commissioner unless the statute had been
fully complied with. " The decision to accept a voluntary disclosure
and not to recommend prosecution was purely administrative, not
judicially reviewable, and hinged in part on the good faith decision of
the Bureau to abide by its word.
The taxpayer, then, had to rely on the integrity of Bureau officials.
This seemingly absolute authority of the Bureau could be checked in
two possible ways so as to avert prosecution. First, the Department
of Justice could reject prosecution if, in its view, the voluntary dis-
closure had been valid, or the disclosure would likely negative the
element of willfulness in the minds of jurors." Thus, even though
voluntary disclosure was not a legal defense to criminal prosecution,
the Justice Department accorded it weight in assessing the chances
for conviction. Secondly, a motion to suppress would be sustained as
to statements made by the taxpayer if the disclosure was shown to
be bona fide and timely. United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d
394 (7th Cir. 1955).
The numerous difficulties which inhered in the administration of a
policy lacking in specific guidelines was a major reason for its aban-
donment of the voluntary disclosure policy on January 10, 1952.45 In
announcing its abandonment, the Treasury Department stated:
particular case, and if they refuse to compromise, their judgment is not
reviewable by any court or jury .... Now, therefore, I charge you as a
matter of law that neither court nor jury under our system has the
right to review policy made by officials of the executive branch, like the
Secretary of Treasury, or any administrative decisions made by the
Secretary of the Treasury involving the determination of fact...
While it is clear that Judge Kennedy was referring to the compromise statute, this
holding of law would apply, it would seem, to administrative determinations of
whether a voluntary disclosure was in fact voluntary and timely.
42 163 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1947).
43 278 U.S. at 288-289, referring to Rev. Stat. 3229, which provided in pertinent
part:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the advice and consent of
the Secretary of the Treasury, may compromise any civil or criminal
case arising under the internal revenue laws instead of commencing suit
thereon; and, with the advice and consent of the said Secretary and the
recommendation of the Attorney-General, he may compromise any such
case after a suit thereon has been commenced.
44 Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasion (4th Ed. 1976), Section 4.03, p. 4-4.
45Treasury Dept. Announcements S-2930, Ja. 10, 1952.
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Litigation in the courts in recent years has illustrated the
controversial nature of the question as to what constitutes a
true voluntary disclosure in fact. In the administration of the
policy it has been difficult and at times impossible to ascertain
whether the disclosure was made because the taxpayer realized
he was under investigation or whether the disclosure was in
fact voluntary and in reliance on the immunity held out by
the policy.
The intensified enforcement activities of the Bureau's Spe-
cial Tax Fraud Drive and Racket Squads throughout the
country are ferreting out the willful tax evaders, and resulting
in recovery of the additional taxes and penalties due the
government.4"
The Treasury Department also emphasized that a voluntary disclosure
often held up prosecution; that the Bureau still had to resort to statutory
remedies to collect the contemplated civil remedies; that it was felt that
black marketeers and racketeers should not be able to utilize the
policy;47 that staffing to enforce the internal revenue laws had im-
proved; and, finally and significantly, the policy was perceived by
congressional authorities as having "... furnished an apt vehicle for
some corruption in high places." 48
Whatever the reasons for its abandonment, the voluntary disclosure
policy lingers as an apparent informal policy and for ten years after its
demise as a formal policy there were efforts to revive it.
Almost immediately after its abandonment the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association attempted without success to have the
policy reinstated at an administrative level.49 Thereafter, the Section
drafted legislation"0 to be approved by Congress, but in 1961 the
House of Delegates of the ABA voted against recommending the pro-
posed legislation.
The proposed legislation was essentially intended to provide the
identifiable event by which the timeliness of the disclosure could be
objectively determined. Under the Tax Section's proposal a taxpayer
would have been exempted by statute from prosecution where a
voluntary disclosure was made. A voluntary disclosure would be
deemed timely if made both before the date of a written communica-
tion to the taxpayer from the Treasury Secretary or his delegate that
an investigation of the taxpayer's liability for an indicated taxable
period had been initiated and before the taxpayer had knowledge that
46 Lipton, 30 TAXES 357, at 358.
47 ld. at 359.
48 Baiter, Tax Fraud and Evasion, (4th Ed. 1976), Section 4.02, p. 4-2.
49 Id. at Section 4.05, p. 4-5.50 This somewhat lengthy proposal is set forth in full in Balter, Tax Fraud and
Evasion, (3rd Ed. 1963) at Section 4.5, p. 4-6, n.15. A copy of same is contained
in Appendix.
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an inquiry or investigation was pending.' The burden of proof as to
any issue with respect to the mailing of such written communication
or of the taxpayer's knowledge was on the Secretary. In 1949 the
Bureau had considered a similar, though non-legislative, proposal from
the Tax Section to mail notices to taxpayers, informing them of an
investigation. This suggestion was rejected because it was believed that
honest taxpayers would resent the notice and refuse access to their
books and records and that racketeers and "professional" evaders would
destroy their records, intimidate prospective witnesses, and otherwise
conceal facts which the Bureau could obtain through an unpublicized
investigation.52 Finally, under the proposed legislation the voluntary
disclosure would have to be in writing, and if it was not a full disclosure
the Secretary could bring a civil action in the district court to have
the exemption nullified.
The ABA Tax Section set forth the following justification for a
voluntary disclosure policy in a letter to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
Income-tax evasion is a unique crime, in that our system
of self-assessment imposes peculiar temptations upon tax-
papers, and in that this self-assessment system affects millions
of taxpayers widely differentiated as to education, experience,
intelligence, emotional stability, social consequences, etc.
Hence, the Service already distinguishes among various cases
and gradations of income-tax crimes in determining which
specific instances should be recommended for prosecution
and which should not. The Advisory Group believes that a
carefully drafted policy of voluntary disclosure policy would
be of assistance to enforcement authorities in making the
aforesaid distinction. We submit that voluntary disclosure
prior to initiation of investigation in itself affords an adequate
for including the taxpayer's case among those which are not to
be recommended for prosecution. Such a policy could result
in substantial collection of taxes, penalties, and interest from
individuals who might never be caught in the enforcement
net, or who, if caught, might not be successfully prosecuted
because of lack of sufficient evidence.5 3
Congress had long treated income-tax evasion differently from other
crimes, as evidenced by enactment of a statutory compromise proce-
.51 See Section 7216(b) of the proposal. The requirement of written notice was
suggested by Burns and Rachlin in their January, 1950, article, cited in footnote 2,
at 28 TAXES 39, at 42.
52 Lipton, 30 TAXES 357, at 360.
"
3Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasion, (3rd Ed. 1963), Appendix, page 4.9. This
quote was actually a comment from the Advisory Group appointed to assist a
Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee in making a study of the
administration of the internal revenue laws. It was contained in a letter from
William R. Spofford to Commissioner of Internal Revenue Caplin in support of
reinstatement of the voluntary disclosure policy.
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dure. 5 4 Moreover, even without a formal policy, a voluntary disclosure
often cast doubt on the taxpayer's willfulness and was a factor in
assessing the success of prosecution. Revival of the policy, it was
argued by proponents, would not encourage taxpayers to file fraudulent
returns; no evidence suggested that increases in tax fraud were directly
related to the Treasury's voluntary disclosure policy. Nor was the
ABA Tax Section convinced that such a policy would spur collusion
with Internal Revenue Service officials.,7
The Tax Section and other commentators contended 16 that most of
the difficulties and abuses of the abandoned policy could be cured by
adoption of definite standards, particularly with respect to the cut-off
event which determined the timeliness of the disclosure. This position
was supported by some members of the King Subcommittee, who felt
that Internal Revenue had failed to attempt a workable definition
of the policy.57
Attempts to legislate a voluntary disclosure policy in fact pre-dated
its abandonment. A revenue bill considered by the House Ways and
Means Committee in 1950 provided:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized
to accept voluntary disclosures of underpayments of tax and
shall issues rules and regulations which shall set forth the time
within which such disclosures may be made, and the proce-
dures which must be followed in making such disclosures. The
Commissioner shall not refer to the Department of Justice for
prosecution any case in which the taxpayer had made a full
and complete disclosure in compliance with such rules and
regulations, and proof of such disclosure shall constitute a
defense to the person or persons making such disclosure in
any criminal prosecution with respect to such underpayment
of tax.58
This proposal, essentially similar to the proposal of the Tax Section
of the ABA, provided a statutory exemption from prosecution, with
the marked difference that it left to the Commissioner the formulation
of rules and regulations for determining the timeliness of the disclosure.
In a letter dated June 1, 1950,r 9 the Department of Justice expressed
its opposition to the proposed legislation. In part, the Justice Depart-
ment felt that a statute was unnecessary because the Commissioner
:,4 Letter of Spofford to Commissioner Caplin, reprinted in Appendix to Baiter,
Tax Fraud and Evasion, etc.
55 id.
56 See Burns and Rachlin, 28 TAXES at 43.
5 Lipton, 30 TAXES 361.
r,8 Statement on the Proposal Before the Ways and Means Committee for
Legislation on "Voluntary Disclosure," undated (Reserve materials), from United
States Department of Justice.
59 See footnote 3.
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was presently vested with the power to accept voluntary disclosures,
and that regulations promulgated thereunder would ". . . divert atten-
tion from the main issue in many tax prosecutions by injecting another
issue involving the construction, interpretation, and legality of such
rules and regulations." 0 Perhaps more significantly, Justice expressed
the fear that the Commissioner's obligation not to recommend prosecu-
tion would raise serious legal questions as to its own jurisdiction and
authority in carrying out its mandate to enforce the criminal statutes.
While the Justice Department's opposition was chiefly directed against
making voluntary disclosures statutory, thereby elevating the policy to
a position where it would be a primary tool of revenue collection in-
stead of its proper role as an incidental function of the Commissioner
in collecting the revenues, its reason for challenging the legislative
proposal cut to the core of the policy itself. In a position paper out-
lining its opposition' to the proposed statute, several reasons were
proffered. First, the Department disagreed with the principal reason
advanced for the need of such a policy: to produce more revenue.
Justice saw no proof of that theory. Moreover, in its view racketeers
and flagrant "tax dodgers" who deliberately concealed their fraud were
hardly likely to experience a later change of heart and confess. Indeed,
the opposite effect was seen as more probable: encouraged by the
open invitation of a voluntary disclosure policy they would be encour-
aged to conceal until an investigation was believed to be imminent.
Secondly, the Justice Department contended that a statutory reduction
of punishment for income-tax evasion, that is, an "amnesty to income
tax defaulters," would weaken the enforcement of criminal tax sanc-
tions by permitting the tax evader to inject the collateral fact issue of
voluntary disclosure into a criminal trial, thereby diverting attention
from the main issue of willfulness of intent. Finally, in Justice's view
such a statute would have a detrimental effect on honest taxpayers
who would perceive their government as "begging" for its tax dollars,
thus undermining the nation's voluntary assessment system.
This asserted protection of the "integrity of the tax laws" 02 lies at
the heart of the opposition to the voluntary disclosure policy as a legiti-
mate tool of enforcing the revenue laws. As stated by a vice-chairman
of the Tax Section's Committee on Procedure in Fraud Cases, "... . the
voluntary disclosure policy is inconsistent with the role criminal sanc-
tions are expected to fulfill in the tax system," 03 and the Treasury
Department's abandonment of the voluntary disclosure policy is a
"re-evaluation of the role which the criminal provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code are expected to fulfill." "'
60Id.
61 See footnote 58.
62 Lipton, 30 TAXES at page 361, quoting testimony of Richard C. Schwartz,
assistant head of the Penal Division, at the King Subcommittee hearings.
63 Lipton, 30 TAXES at page 361.
61 Id.
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In 1960, the Treasury Department finally concluded that it would
not re-institute a voluntary disclosure at an administrative level.6 "
Although voluntary disclosure as a formal policy or statutory mandate
appears to be a dead issue at the present time, there lingers an informal
policy of sorts. In August, 1959, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Dana Latham stated:
But in any event, it should be borne in mind that in deter-
mining whether or not an evader should be prosecuted, the
existence of a true voluntary disclosure is an important ele-
ment taken into consideration by Regional Counsel, Intelli-
gence, and the Department of Justice. The Department of
Justice has learned by what may be termed the 'hard way'
that evidence of a truly penitent spirit weighs heavily with a
jury. . . This does not mean that no evader who has made
a voluntary disclosure will not be prosecuted. But it is, never-
theless, a very important element to be considered by you as
practitioner ..
Clearly, the existence of a voluntary disclousre will no longer for-
mally be stated as the reason for not recommending prosecution, but
the Internal Revenue Service, according to one commentator, 7 looks
with favor on bona fide disclosures in failure to file cases (although not
in cases involving the filing of a fraudulent return), and prosecution
may, in fact, be averted by a timely disclosure.", Moreover, even where
the IRS recommends prosecutions the Justice Department may decline
on the ground that the making of a voluntary disclosure may negative
the element of willfulness in the minds of the jurors."' The fact that
one's fraud was disclosed to the IRS may also result in a lighter sen-
6, Baiter, Tax Fraud and Evasion, (3rd Ed. 1963), Appendix, page 4.9.
66 Crowley and Manning, "Representing the Taxpayer Before Trial," (PLI
1976), Section 4.2, page 90; also, Baiter, Tax Fraud and Evasion (3rd Ed. 1963),
Section 4.1, at page 4-1. It was also stated by then Commissioner Latham, in a
letter to the Taxation Section on March 14, 1961:
While our present policy does not guarantee immunity in return for
disclosure we do not close our eyes to a true act of voluntary disclosure.
Our current policy, which is similar to the way we operated from 1919 to
1945, provides that a true disclosure by a taxpayer of intentional evasion
will be one of the factors taken into consideration, along with all the
other facts and circumstances of the case, in deciding whether criminal
prosecution should be recommended. I am sure you will agree that we
are being realistic when we weigh the genuine repentance by the tax-
payer as disclosed by a true disclosure against the chances for a convic-
tion by a jury. In fact, this is the same consideration that is given by
any prosecuting official or defense attorney to similar situations in any
case when criminal action is contemplated.
Balter, supra, at page 4-12.
67 Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasion, (4th Ed. 1976), Section 4.02, page 4-4.
68Id.
69 Id. at Section 4.03, page 4-4.
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tence after conviction.71 Defense attorneys must weigh these factors in
considering whether to advise their clients to make a voluntary dis-
closure.
The announcement of a formal voluntary disclosure policy appears
to have been occasioned by the seriously overburdened enforcement
activities of the then Bureau of Internal Revenue during the second
world war. While its principal purpose was to aid the collection of
revenue, its earlier genesis suggests perhaps that it should be viewed as
the embodiment of a philosophy of tax administration that distinguishes
tax evasion from other crimes, and that it is a policy consistent with a
public benefit. It is arguable that the delineation of specific guidelines
could have possibly rescued the voluntary disclosure policy from the
serious administrative problems which arose after its formal announce-
ment. Its abandonment was in large part attributable to the failure of
the IRS to address these difficulties. At the same time the controversial
nature of the policy called into question the role of criminal sanctions
in the federal tax system. In a system of self-assessment which depended
on the honesty of taxpayers, the voluntary disclosure appeared both
fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with criminal enforcement activi-
ties. Perhaps widespread abuse of the voluntary disclosure policy was
more illusory than real. Nevertheless, in the minds of many, the volun-
tary disclosure policy suggested an indifference to willful evasion. It is
this inherent weakness in the policy, rather than administrative difficul-
ties, which more probably sounded the death knell of the policy. In the
opinion of the writer, it is not likely that it will be resurrected.
70 Id. at Section 4.04, page 4-5. Baiter provides the example of the case of
United States v. Szabo, N.2-7203 (S.D. Cal. 1958), in which a taxpayer, after
being contacted by a special agent, immediately began a review of his tax situa-
tion, hiring accountants and counsel. Within a few months he made a disclosure
and filed amended returns, paying some additional $100,000 in taxes and interest.
The District Court considered this a voluntary disclosure and fined the defendant
only $50 on each of two counts.
